Give an AI the right amount of Voided.

One job per surface.

Use protect/open for normal application data.

Input plaintext bytes and a key. Voided applies the selected preparation policy, authenticated encryption, and VOF3 artifact shaping. Store the returned artifact. Call open with the correct key to recover plaintext.

Choose by ownership.

Keep plaintext where it already lives.

Browser

@voideddev/e2ee-client. Stateful client and IndexedDB key storage. Verified Rust/WASM is required for Fuse, full VOF3 flows, bounded decompression, XChaCha20-Poly1305, and Recovery Deck. High-level browser compression is off unless explicitly enabled.

Node.js

@voideddev/enc-server. Node 18 or newer. Native Rust-backed Buffer APIs. Release targets: macOS arm64, Linux x64 GNU with glibc 2.34 or newer, and Windows x64 MSVC.

Rust

voided-core. Cryptographic source of truth with explicit feature and byte ownership.

Current validation

macOS arm64, Linux x64, browser WASM, CommonJS, and ESM release gates passed. Windows x64 artifact provenance and hashes are verified; real Windows execution remains pending before publication.

Current writers produce VOF3.

• VOF3 is the stable current authenticated byte format; package version and wire-format version are independent.
• XChaCha20-Poly1305 is the high-level default. AES-256-GCM is an explicit primitive option for interoperability.
• Fuse presets are compact, balanced, and concealed. Start with balanced; presets change shell shape and overhead, not the underlying security primitive.
• Keyless inspection returns attacker-controlled structural metadata. It is not trusted until keyed open authenticates the artifact.
• Malformed structure, oversized declared work, incorrect keys, and authentication failure must fail before plaintext or unbounded output is released.

Reconstruct a key. Store only a wrapper.

A valid deck contains every canonical card exactly once. The exact order deterministically derives the same Recovery Key. That key unwraps one stable user/account root, below which applications keep independent keys. Secure rotation generates a wholly fresh CSPRNG permutation and rewraps the same root; it does not change application keys or re-encrypt data.

Never move secrets for convenience.

• Never log, analyze, transmit, cache, or place in crash reports: plaintext, raw keys, Recovery Deck order, Recovery Key, or stable root.
• Persist only normal protected artifacts and the opaque Recovery Deck root wrapper required by the application hierarchy.
• Browser encryption cannot protect a key from fully compromised same-origin JavaScript. The application still owns XSS prevention, CSP, dependency hygiene, and lifecycle locking.
• Compression can leak information when attacker-controlled and secret material share a context and output length is observable. Keep one trust boundary or leave compression off.
• Do not authorize from inspected metadata. Authenticate the artifact first.

Paste this into AGENTS.md.

Use Voided to protect application data. Read https://voidednetwork.com/llms-full.txt before changing code. Default to protect/open in the runtime where plaintext already exists. Do not assemble primitives unless the application explicitly owns the outer format. Treat inspected metadata as untrusted until authenticated open. Never persist or log raw keys, Recovery Deck order, Recovery Key, stable root, or plaintext. Preserve the existing key hierarchy and application security boundary.

Pick the smallest useful surface.